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The First Amendment in Cyberspace
Cass R. Sunsteint

I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue
and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue
among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No
theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us secure. To
suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness
without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If there be
sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be
exercised in the selection of these men; so that we do not depend on
their virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but in the people who are
to choose them.1

[T]he right of electing the members of the Government constitutes
more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government.
The value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the
comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and
on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing
these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively.2
"[T]elevision is just another appliance. It's a toaster with pictures. ''

t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence. Law School and Department
of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Elena Kagan, Larry Lessig. Geoffrey Stone.
David Strauss, and Eugene Volokh for helpful comments, and to Sophie Clark for research assistance and
valuable discussions. An overlapping but much shorter essay. The Future of the FirstAmendment. appears
as an afterword to CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND TIE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (2d ed. 1995).
1. James Madison, Remarks to the Virginia Convention (June 20. 1788). in 3 TlE DEBATES IN THE

536-37 (photo. reprnt
1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
2. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions. Feb. 7. 1777, in 6 WRm Ns oF JAMES
MADISON 341, 397 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) In his report. Madison objects to the Sedition Act on First
Amendment grounds.
3. Bernard D. Nossiter, Licenses To Coin Money: The FC.C. sBig Giveaway Show. 240 NATION 402
(1985) (quoting Mark Fowler, former FCC Chair).
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSITTmON
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THE FUTURE

Imagine you had a device that combined a telephone, a TV, a
camcorder, and a personal computer. No matter where you went or
what time it was, your child could see you and talk to you, you could
watch a replay of your team's last game, you could browse the latest
additions to the library, or you could find the best prices in town on
groceries, furniture, clothes-whatever you needed.
Imagine further the dramatic changes in your life if.
- The best schools, teachers, and courses were available to all
students, without regard to geography, distance, resources, or
disability;
- The vast resources of art, literature, and science were available
everywhere, not just in large institutions or big-city libraries and
museums;
- Services that improve America's health care system and respond
to other important social needs were available on-line, without waiting
in line, when and where you needed them;
- You could live in many places without foregoing opportunities
for useful and fulfilling employment, by "telecommuting" to your
office through an electronic highway...
* You could see the latest movies, play the hottest video games,
or bank and shop from the comfort of your home whenever you
chose;
- You could obtain government information directly or through
local organizations like libraries, apply for and receive government
benefits electronically, and get in touch with government officials
easily ..

.

Thus wrote the Department of Commerce on September 15, 1993, when the
federal government announced an "Agenda for Action" with respect to "the
National Information Infrastructure." 5 The statement may seem weirdly
futuristic, but the nation is not at all far from what it prophesies, and in ways
that have already altered social and legal relations and categories.
Consider the extraordinarily rapid development of the institution of
electronic mail, which lies somewhere between ordinary conversation ("voice
mail") and ordinary written communication ("snail mail" or "hard mail"), or
which perhaps should be described as something else altogether. E-mail has its
own characteristic norms and constraints. Those norms and constraints are an
important part of the informal, unwritten law of cyberspace. The norms and
constraints are a form of customary law, determining how and when people

4. Administration Policy Statement, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,026 (1993).
5. Id.
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communicate with one another.6 Perhaps there will be a formal codification
movement before too long; certainly the norms and constraints are codified in
the sense that, without government assistance, they are easily accessible by
people who want to know what they are.7
The Commerce Department's claims about location have started to come
true. What it meant to "live in California" became altogether different, after
the invention of the airplane, from what it meant in (say) 1910. With the
advent of new communications technologies, the meaning of the statement, "I
live in California" has changed at least as dramatically. If people can have
instant access to all libraries and all movies, and if they can communicate with
a wide range of public officials, pharmacists, educators, doctors, and lawyers
by touching a few buttons, they may as well (for most purposes) live
anywhere.
In any case, the existence of technological change promises to test the
system of free expression in dramatic ways. What should be expected with
respect to the First Amendment?
II. THE PRESENT: MARKETS AND MADISON
There are two free speech traditions in the United States, not simply one.'
There have been two models of the First Amendment, corresponding to the
two free speech traditions. The first emphasizes well-functioning speech
markets. It can be traced to Justice Holmes' great Abrams dissent, 9 where the
notion of a "market in ideas" received its preeminent exposition. The market
model emerges as well from Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,"'

invalidating a "right of reply" law as applied to candidates for elected office.
It finds its most recent defining statement not in judicial decisions, but in an
FCC opinion rejecting the fairness doctrine."
The second tradition, and the second model, focuses on public deliberation.
The second model can be traced from its origins in the work of James
Madison, 12 with his attack on the idea of seditious libel, to Justice Louis
Brandeis, with his suggestion that "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert

6. See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 38-64 (1993). The area thus fortits the
analysis in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WIHOLT LAW (1991). of how social norms can develop lawlikc
constraints in the absence of actual law.
7. LEXIS Counsel Connect has posted a statement of recommended online etiqucttc. which, following
customary usage, it calls "netiquette." LEXIS Counsel Connect. Netiquetne. Aug. 13. 1994. available online
at LEXIS Counsel Connect, Discuss Menu, Browse: About the Discussion Groups Forum.
8. The distinction is elided in the best general treatment. HARRY KALVEN JR.. A WORTHlY TRADMON
(1992).
dissenting)
9. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes. J..
10. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
11. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH. 2 EC.C.R. 5043. 5054-55 (1987)
12. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEiOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECHfat xvi-xvit (1993).
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people,"' 3 through the work of Alexander Meiklejohn, who associated the free
speech principle not with laissez-faire economics, but with ideals of democratic
deliberation.' 4 The Madisonian tradition culminated in New York Times v.
Sullivan 5 and the reaffirmation of the fairness doctrine in the Red Lion
case,' 6 with the Supreme Court's suggestion that governmental efforts to
encourage diverse views and attention to public issues are compatible with the
free speech principle--even if they result in regulatory controls on the owners
of speech sources.
Under the marketplace metaphor, the First Amendment requires-at least
as a presumption-a free speech market, or in other words a system of
unrestricted economic markets in speech. Government must respect the forces
of supply and demand. At the very least, it may not regulate the content of
speech so as to push the speech market in its preferred directions. Certainly it
must be neutral with respect to viewpoint. A key point for marketplace
advocates is that great distrust of government is especially appropriate when
speech is at issue. Illicit motives are far too likely to underlie regulatory
initiatives. For the marketplace model, Tornillo 7 is perhaps the central case.
The FCC has at times come close to endorsing the market model, above all in
its decision abandoning the fairness doctrine.'" When the FCC did this, it
referred to the operation of the forces of supply and demand, and suggested
that those forces would produce an optimal mix of entertainment options.' 9
Hence former FCC Chair Mark Fowler described television as "just another
appliance. It's a toaster with pictures. 20 Undoubtedly, the rise of new
communications technologies will be taken to fortify this claim.2
Those who endorse the marketplace model do not claim that government
may not do anything at all. Of course government may set up the basic rules
of property and contract; it is these rules that make markets feasible. Without
such rules, markets cannot exist at all.22 Government is also permitted to
13. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
14. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).

15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
17. 418 U.S. 241 (1978).

18. See Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5055 (1987).
19. See id.
20. Nossiter, supra note 3, at 402.
21. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principlesfor
Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719 (1995).
22. Thus wrote the greatest critic of socialism in the 20th century:
It is regrettable, though not difficult to explain, that in the past much less attention has
been given to the positive requirements of a successful working of the competitive system than
to these [previously discussed] negative points. The functioning of a competition not only
requires adequate organization of certain institutions like money, markets, and channels of
information--some of which can never be adequately provided by private enterprise--but it
depends, above all, on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed
both to preserve competition and to make it operate as beneficially as possible....
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protect against market failures, especially by preventing monopolies and
monopolistic practices. Structural regulation is acceptable so long as it is a
content-neutral attempt to ensure competition. It is therefore important to note
that advocates of marketplaces and democracy might work together in seeking
to curtail monopoly. Of course, the prevention of monopoly is a precondition
for well-functioning information markets.
Government has a final authority, though this authority does not easily fall
within the marketplace model itself. Most people who accept the marketplace
model acknowledge that government is permitted to regulate the various welldefined categories of controllable speech, such as obscenity, false or
misleading commercial speech, and libel. 23 This acknowledgment will have
large and not yet explored consequences for government controls on new
information technologies. Perhaps the government's power to control obscene,
threatening, or libelous speech will justify special rules for cyberspace.' 4 But
with these qualifications, the commitment to free economic markets is the
basic constitutional creed.
Many people think that there is now nothing distinctive about the
electronic media or about modem communications technologies that justifies
an additional governmental role.25 If such a role was ever justified, they
would argue, it was because of problems of scarcity. When only three
television networks exhausted the available options, a market failure may have
called for regulation designed to ensure that significant numbers of people
were not left without their preferred programming.2 But this is no longer a
problem. With so dramatic a proliferation of stations, most people can obtain
the programming they want, or will be able to soon.27 With cyberspace,
people will be able to make or to participate in their own preferred
programming in their own preferred "locations" on the Internet. With new
technologies, perhaps there are no real problems calling for governmental
controls, except for those designed to establish the basic framework.

In no system that could be rationally defended would the state just do nothing. An
effective competitive system needs an intelligently designed and continuously adjusted legal
framework as much as any other.
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 38-39 (1944).

23. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 49?) (1981); Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S.
323 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
24. See infra part V.C.7.
25. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH. 2 FC.C.R. 5043 (1987): TIIOMAS
G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR.. REGULATING

BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 277 (1994);

Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 21.
26. See BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICs (1992).

27. Of course, significant numbers of Americans do not have cable television-now about 38% of
households that have television-and many citizens are without access to the Internet. NRTC Executive:
DirecTv a Big Hit in the Country. MULTICHANNEL NEWS. Dec. 15, 1994, at 32 (hereinafter DirecTv a Big
Hit]; see infra text accompanying notes 145-51.
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The second model, receiving its most sustained attention in the writings
of Alexander Meiklejohn,28 emphasizes that our constitutional system is one
of deliberative democracy. This system prizes both political (not economic)
equality and a shared civic culture. It seeks to promote, as a central democratic
goal, reflective and deliberative debate about possible courses of action. The
Madisonian model sees the right of free expression as a key part of the system
of public deliberation.
On this view, even a well-functioning information market29 is not
immune from government controls. Government is certainly not permitted to
regulate speech however it wants; it may not restrict speech on the basis of
viewpoint. But it may regulate the electronic media or even cyberspace to
promote, in a sufficiently neutral way, a well-functioning democratic regime.
It may attempt to promote attention to public issues. It may try to ensure
diversity of view. It may promote political speech at the expense of other
forms of speech. In particular, educational and public-affairs programming, on
the Madisonian view, has a special place.
I cannot attempt in this space to defend fully the proposition that the
Madisonian conception is superior to the marketplace alternative as a matter
of constitutional law;30 a few brief notes will have to suffice. The argument
for the Madisonian conception is partly historical; the American free speech
tradition owes much of its origin and shape to a conception of democratic selfgovernment. The marketplace conception is a creation of the twentieth century,
not of the eighteenth. As a matter of history, it confuses modem notions of
consumer sovereignty in the marketplace with democratic understandings of
sovereignty, symbolized by the transfer of sovereignty from the King to "We
the People." The American free speech tradition finds its origin in that
conception of sovereignty, which, in Madison's view, doomed the Sedition Act
on constitutional grounds.3 '
But the argument for Madisonianism does not rest only on history; it is
partly evaluative as well. We are unlikely to be able to make sense of our
considered judgments about free speech problems without insisting that the free
speech principle is centrally (though certainly not exclusively) connected with
democratic goals, 32 and without acknowledging that marketplace thinking is
inadequately connected with the point and function of a system of free
expression. A well-functioning democracy requires a degree of citizen
participation, which requires a degree of information;33 and large disparities

28. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14.
29. See the futuristic picture in Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J,
1805 (1995), on the risks posed by such a system.
30. I try to do this in SUNSTEIN, supra note 12.
31. Id. at xvii.
32. See JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 136-38 (1994).
33. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
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in political (as opposed to economic) equality are damaging to democratic
aspirations. 34 To the extent that the Madisonian view prizes education,
democratic deliberation, and political equality, it is connected, as the
marketplace conception is not, with the highest ideals of American
constitutionalism.
Some people think that the distinction between marketplace and
Madisonian models is now an anachronism. Perhaps the two models
conflicted at an earlier stage in history; but in one view, Madison has no place
in an era of limitless broadcasting options and cyberspace. Perhaps new
technologies now mean that Madisonian goals can best be satisfied in a system
of free markets. Now that so many channels, e-mail options, and discussion
"places" are available, cannot everyone read or see what they wish? If people
want to spend their time on public issues, are there not countless available
opportunities? Is this not especially true with the emergence of the Internet?
Is it not hopelessly paternalistic, or anachronistic, for government to regulate
for Madisonian reasons?
I do not believe that these questions are rhetorical. We know enough to
know that even in a period of limitless options, our communications system
may fail to promote an educated citizenry and political equality. Madisonian
goals may be severely compromised even under technologically extraordinary
conditions. There is no logical or a priori connection between a wellfunctioning system of free expression and limitless broadcasting or Internet
options. We could well imagine a science fiction story in which a wide range
of options coexisted with little or no high-quality fare for children, with
widespread political apathy or ignorance, and with social balkanization in
which most people's consumption choices simply reinforced their own
prejudices and platitudes, or even worse.
Quite outside of science fiction, it is foreseeable that free markets in
communications will be a mixed blessing. They could create a kind of
accelerating "race to the bottom," in which many or most people see lowquality programming involving trumped-up scandals or sensationalistic
anecdotes calling for little in terms of quality or quantity of attention. It is
easily imaginable that well-functioning markets in communications will bring
about a situation in which many of those interested in politics merely fortify
their own unreflective judgments, and are exposed to little or nothing in the
way of competing views.36 It is easily imaginable that the content of the most
34. See the discussion of the fair value of political liberties in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL UBERALiSM
356-63 (1993).
35. See generally KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 25.
36. Note in this regard The Wall Street Journal's recently released Personal Journal, which is
available online. Each subscriber receives only the portion of the Journal that is "'relevant" to him. which

includes major headlines and news stories on the 10 corporations he has chosen to follow. See Michael
Putzel, A Personal Journal from Dow Jones. BOSToN GLOBE, Feb. 6. 1995. at 19: Morning Edition.
"PersonalJournal" Delivers News Based on Need (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. II. 1995).
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widely viewed programming will be affected by the desires of advertisers, in
such a way as to produce shows that represent a bland, watered-down version
of conventional morality, and that do not engage serious issues in a serious
way for fear of offending some group in the audience.37
Consider, by way of summary of existing fare, the suggestion that
TV favors a mentality in which certain things no longer matter
particularly: skills like the ability to enjoy a complex argument, for
instance, or to perceive nuances, or to keep in mind large amounts of
significant information, or to remember today what someone said last
month, or to consider strong and carefully argued opinions in defiance
of what is conventionally called "balance." Its content lurches
between violence of action, emotional hyperbole, and blandness of
opinion.... Commercial TV... has come to present society as a

pagan circus of freaks, pseudo-heroes, and wild morons, struggles on
the sand of a Colosseum without walls. It thus helps immeasurably to
worsen the defects of American public education and of tabloid news
in print.
From the standpoint of the present, it is easily imaginable that the
television--or the personal computer carrying out communications
functions-will indeed become "just another appliance ...a toaster with
pictures," and that the educative or aspirational goals of the First Amendment
will be lost or even forgotten.
I shall say more about these points below.39 For now it is safe to say that
the law of free speech will ultimately have to make some hard choices about
the marketplace and democratic models. It is also safe to say that the changing
nature of the information market will test the two models in new ways. In fact,
the Supreme Court has recently offered an important discussion of the topic,
Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC.4" Turner is also the most sustained
exploration of the relationship between conventional legal categories and the
new information technologies. The decision contains a range of lessons for the
future.
My principal purpose here is to discuss the role of the First Amendment
and Madisonianism in cyberspace-or, more simply, the nature of
constitutional constraints on government regulation of electronic broadcasting,
especially in the aftermath of Turner. In so doing, I will cover a good deal of
ground, and a number of issues of law and policy, in a relatively short space.
I do, however, offer three relatively simple goals to help organize the
discussion. Most important, I attempt to make a defense of Madisonian

37. See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVEImSING AND A DEMoCRATIc PRESS 44-70 (1994).

38. Robert Hughes, Why Watch It, Anyway?, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Feb. 16, 1995, at 38.
39. See infra part V.B.2.
40. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
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conceptions of free speech, even in a period in which scarcity is no longer a
serious problem. The defense stresses the risks of sensationalism, ignorance,
failure of deliberation, and balkanization-risks that are in some ways
heightened by new developments. In the process I discuss some of the
questions that are likely to arise in the next generation of free speech law.
I have two other goals as well. I attempt to identify an intriguing and new
model of the First Amendment and to ask whether that model-the Turner
model-is well adapted to the future of the speech market. A relatively
detailed and somewhat technical discussion of Turner should prove useful,
because the case raises the larger issues in a concrete setting.
I also urge that, for the most part, the emerging technologies do not raise
new questions about basic principle but instead produce new areas for applying
or perhaps testing old principles. The existing analogies are often very good,
and this means that the new law can begin by building fairly comfortably on
the old. The principal problem with the old law is not so much that it is poorly
adapted for current issues-though in some cases it may be-but that it does
not depend on a clear sense of the purpose or point of the system of free
expression. In building law for an age of cyberspace, government
officials-within the judiciary and elsewhere-should be particularly careful
not to treat doctrinal categories as ends in themselves. Much less should they
act as if the First Amendment is a purposeless abstraction unconnected to
ascertainable social goals. Instead they should keep in mind that the free
speech principle has a point, or a set of points. Among its points is the
commitment to democratic self-government.
El.

TURNER:

A NEW

DEPARTURE?

The Turner case is by far the most important judicial discussion of new
media technologies, and it has a range of implications for the future. I
therefore begin with that case, turning to broader issues of law and policy in
Part V. It is important, however, to say that Turner involved two highly
distinctive problems: (a) the peculiar "bottleneck" produced by the current
system of cable television, in which cable owners can control access to
programming; and (b) the possible risk to free television programming created
by the rise of pay television. These problems turned out to be central to the
outcome in the case. For this reason, Turner is quite different from imaginable
future cases involving new information technologies, including the Internet,
which includes no bottleneck problem. Significantly, the Internet is owned by
no one and controlled by no organization. But at least potentially, the
principles in Turner will extend quite broadly. This is especially true insofar
as the Court adopted ingredients of an entirely new model of the First
Amendment and insofar as the Court set out principles governing content
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discrimination, viewer access, speaker access, and regulation of owners of
speech sources.
A. The Background
In the last decade, it has become clear that cable television will be in
potential competition with free broadcasting. In 1992, motivated in large part
by concerns about this form of competition, Congress enacted the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act).4 The Act
contains a range of provisions designed to protect broadcasting and local
producers, and also at least nominally designed to protect certain consumers
from practices by the cable industry. The relevant provisions include rate
regulations for cable operators, a prohibition on exclusive franchise agreements
between cable operators and municipalities, and42 restrictions on affiliations
between cable programmers and cable operators.
A major part of the Act was motivated by the fear that cable television's
success could damage broadcast television.43 If cable flourishes, perhaps
broadcasters will fail? The scenario seems at least plausible in light of
important differences in relevant technologies. Broadcast television comes, of
course, from transmitting antennae. It is available for free, though in its current
form, it cannot provide more than a few stations. By contrast, cable systems
make use of a physical connection between television sets and a transmission
facility, and through this route cable operators can provide a large number of
stations. Cable operators are of course in a position to decide which stations,
and which station owners, will be available on cable television; cable operators
could thus refuse to carry local broadcasters. To be sure, cable operators must
respond to forces of supply and demand, and perhaps they would do poorly if
they failed to carry local broadcasters. But because they have "bottleneck
control" over the stations that they will carry, they are in one sense
monopolists, or at least so Congress appears to have thought.
For purposes of policymaking, an important consideration is that about
forty percent of Americans lack a cable connection, and must therefore rely on
broadcast stations." (This is a point of general importance in light of the
possibility that access to communications technology will in the future be
unequally distributed.) In the Act, the potential conflict between cable and
broadcast television led Congress to set out two crucial, hotly disputed
provisions. Both provisions required cable operators to carry the signals of

41. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp. V 1993).
42. See the outline in Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2452-53.
43. See S. ReP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133,
1135-36.
44. 114 S. Ct. at 2451.
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local broadcast television stations. These "must-carry" rules were the focus of
the Turner case.

The first provision, section 4, imposes must-carry rules for "local
commercial television stations."45 Under the Act, cable systems with more
than twelve active channels and more than three hundred available channels
must set aside as many as one-third of their channels for commercial broadcast
stations requesting carriage.*6 These stations are defined to include all fullpower television broadcasters except those that qualify as "noncommercial
educational" stations.47
Section 5 adds a different requirement. 48 It governs "noncommercial
educational television stations," defined to include (a) stations that are owned
and operated by a municipality and that transmit "predominantly
noncommercial programs for educational purposes '

9

or (b) stations that are

licensed by the FCC as such stations and that are eligible to receive grants
from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.5' Section 5 imposes separate
must-carry rules on noncommercial educational stations. A cable system with
more than thirty-six channels must carry each local public broadcast station
requesting carriage;5 a station having between thirteen and thirty-six must
carry between one and three; 52 and a station with twelve or fewer channels
must carry at least one.53

What was the purpose of the must-carry rules? This is a complex matter.
A skeptic, or perhaps a realist, might well say that the rules were simply a
product of the political power of the broadcasting industry. Perhaps the
broadcasting industry was trying to protect its economic interests at the
expense of cable. This is a quite reasonable suggestion, for it is unlikely that
market arrangements would lead to a situation in which significant numbers
of Americans are entirely without access to television broadcasting. The
scenario that Congress apparently feared-a victory of cable television over the
broadcasting industry, with the result that forty percent of Americans would
lack television at all-seems wildly unrealistic. Insofar as Congress was
responding to the interests of local broadcasters, it may well have been
catering to interest-power rather than attempting to protect otherwise deprived
consumers.
Here there is a large lesson for the future. New regulations, ostensibly
defended as public-interested or as helping viewers and consumers, will often
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. V 1993)
Id. § 534(b)(I).
Id. § 534(b)(1)(A)-(B).
Id. § 535.
Id. § 535(/)(I)(B).
Id. § 535(I)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. § 535(b)(1).
Id. § 535(b)(3).
Id. § 535(b)(2).
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be a product of private self-interest, and not good for the public at all. It is
undoubtedly true that industries will often seek government help against the
marketplace, invoking public-spirited justifications for self-interested ends.54
Whether and to what extent this is a constitutional (as opposed to a political)
problem may be disputed. 55 But it points to a distinctive and legitimate
concern about governmental regulation of the communications industry.
The interest-group account therefore has considerable plausibility. On the
other hand, some people might reasonably think that the must-carry rules were
a good-faith effort to protect local broadcasters, not because of their political
power, but because their speech is valuable. Their speech is valuable because
it ensures that viewers will be able to see discussion of local political issues.
Perhaps the must-carry rules-especially section 5, but perhaps section 4 as
well-had powerful Madisonian justifications insofar as cable operators might
choose stations that failed to offer adequate discussion of issues of public
concern, especially to the local community. Other observers might invoke a
different justification, also with Madisonian overtones. Perhaps the effort to
protect broadcasters was a legitimate effort to safeguard the broadcasting
industry, not because of the political power of the broadcasters, and not
because of the content of broadcast service, but because millions of Americans
must rely on broadcasters for their programming. Perhaps Congress wanted to
ensure universal viewer access to the television market. On this view, the key
goal behind the must-carry rules was to ensure viewer access.
Let us put these possibilities to one side and take up the constitutional
issue. In Turner, the cable operators challenged sections 4 and 5 as inconsistent
with the First Amendment. They did not make a distinction between section
4 and section 5; to the cable companies, both provisions were illegitimate
interferences with their right to choose such programming as they wished. For
obvious reasons, the government also made no such distinctions. The
government wanted to defend both provisions, and a defense of section 5, by
itself, would produce only a partial victory. The key aspects of the case lay in
the operators' contention that both sections amounted to a form of content
regulation, and that even if they should be seen as content-neutral, they were
unconstitutional because inadequately justified.
B. The Genesis of the Turner Model
In its response, the Court created something very much like a new model
for understanding the relationship between new technologies and the First
54. This is a simple insight of public choice theory. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FpICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
55. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 65 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams, J.,

dissenting) (treating interest-group feature of case as relevant to constitutional issue), vacated and
remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
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Amendment. This model is a competitor to the marketplace and Madisonian
alternatives. And while it is somewhat unruly, it is not difficult to describe. It
comes from the five basic components of the Court's response to the cable
operators' challenge.
First, the Court held that cable television would not be subject to the more
lenient free speech limitations applied to broadcasters.56 On the Court's view,
the key to the old broadcast cases was scarcity, and scarcity is not a problem
for cable stations. To be sure, there are possible "market dysfunctions" for
cable television; as noted, cable operators may in a sense be a monopoly by
virtue of their "bottleneck control." But this structural fact did not, in the
Court's view, dictate a more lenient approach in the cable context. In the
Court's view, the key point in the past cases had to do with scarcity.
This is an especially significant holding. It suggests that new
technologies will generally be subject to ordinary free speech standards, not to
the more lenient standards applied to broadcasters. Scarcity is rarely a problem
for new technologies.
Second, the Court said that the Act was content-neutral, and therefore
subject to the more lenient standards governing content-neutral restrictions on
speech. For the Court, the central point is that "the must-carry rules, on their
face, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the content of
speech., 58 This is because "the extent of the interference does not depend
upon the content of the cable operators' programming." 59 In the Court's view,
the regulations are certainly speaker-based, since we have to know who the
speaker is to know whether the regulations apply; but they are not contentbased, since they do not punish or require speech of a particular content.
This holding is also quite important. It means that Congress will be
permitted to regulate particular technologies in particular ways, so long as the
regulation is not transparently a subterfuge for a legislative desire to promote
particular points of view. It means that Congress can give special benefits to
special sources, or impose special burdens on disfavored industries.
Third, the Court said that there was insufficient reason to believe that a
content-based "purpose" underlay the content-neutral must-carry law.' Hence
the content neutrality of the law could not be impeached by an investigation
of the factors that led to its enactment. The Court explored the relevant

56. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. CL 2445. 2456-58 (1994).
57. It is also quite vulnerable. All goods are scarce, in a sense, and hence the scarcity rationale has
never been a secure one. See Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission. 2 .L & EcON.
1, 14, 20 (1959). Perhaps market failures of a certain sort justified special controls on local broadcasting.
See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 26. at 275-76. But if this is true, the question becomes whether there
are market failures, and of what sorts, rather than whether there is "'scarcity.- Hence the Court's crisp
distinction between scarce sources and nonscarce sources is quite crude.
58. 114 S. CL at 2460.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2461-62.
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legislative findings, which showed not only a (by hypothesis questionable")
congressional interest in encouraging the sorts of programming offered by local
broadcasters, but also a distinctive and legitimate concern that cable operators
have a strong financial interest in favoring their own affiliated programmers,
and in doing so at the expense of broadcast stations. The findings therefore
suggested that the cable operators have an economic incentive not to carry
local signals.
This fact led to the important problem supporting the Act: Without the
must-carry provision, Congress concluded, there would be a threat to the
continued availability of free local broadcast television.62 The elimination of
broadcast television would in turn be undesirable not because broadcasters
deserve protection as such-they do not-but because (a) broadcast television
is free and (b) there is a substantial government interest in assuring access to
free programming, especially for people who cannot afford to pay for
television. As Congress had it, the must-carry rules would ensure that the
broadcast stations would stay in business.
The Court said that this purpose-the protection of access to free
programming through the protection of broadcast stations-was unrelated to
the content of broadcast expression and was therefore legitimate. It was
significant in this regard that for Congress to seek to protect broadcasters,
Congress did not have to favor any particular kind or speech or any particular
point of view. To be sure, and importantly, Congress' description of the
purposes of the Act also referred to a content-based concern-to the effect that
broadcast programming is "an important source of local news[,] public-affairs
programming and other local broadcast services critical to an informed
electorate," and also to the judgment that noncommercial television in
particular "provides educational and informational programming to the Nation's
citizens. 63 On the Court's view, however, these statements did not show that
the law was content-based. The acknowledgment of certain virtues of broadcast
programming did not mean that Congress enacted the legislation because it
regarded broadcast programming as substantively preferable to cable
programming.
Fourth, the Court said that strict judicial scrutiny was not required by the
fact that the provisions (a) compel speech by cable operators, (b) favor
broadcast programmers over cable programmers, and (c) single out certain
members of the press for disfavored treatment. 64 The fact that speech was
mandated was irrelevant because the mandate was content-neutral and because
61. It is questionable because it is content-discriminatory. In the end, content discrimination of this
sort might be legitimate, see infra text accompanying notes 77-82 (discussing Justice O'Connor's analysis),
but there is of course a presumption against it.
62. 114 S. Ct. at 2455.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2464.
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cable operators would not be forced to alter their own messages to respond to
the broadcast signals. So too, the Court said that a speaker-based regulation
would not face special judicial hostility so long as it was content-neutral. It
was important in this regard that the regulation of this particular industry was
based on the special characteristics of that industry-in short, "the bottleneck
monopoly power exercised by cable operators and the dangers this power poses
to the viability of broadcast television. 65 In such a case, the Court concluded,
legislative selectivity would be acceptable.
These conclusions are also of special importance for the future. They
reinforce the point that Congress may favor some industries over others. They
also suggest that Congress may compel companies to give access to speakers,
at least so long as (a) the companies themselves are permitted to offer the
messages they favor and (b) the access rights are given out on a contentneutral basis. The Tunzer Court stressed the governmental goal of ensuring
access to free programming for viewers; but in upholding the Act, it also said
that it was legitimate to require access for speakers, so long as the requirement
of content neutrality was met.
Finally, the Court explored the question whether the must-carry rules
would be acceptable as content-neutral regulations of speech. Content-neutral
regulations may well be invalid if they fail a kind of balancing test.' The
Court concluded that "intermediate scrutiny" would be applied.6" The Court
said the appropriate test, drawing on familiar cases," would involve an
exploration whether the regulation furthers an important or substantial
government interest and whether the restriction on First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than necessary to promote that government interest. The Court
had no difficulty in finding three substantial interests: (a) preserving free local
television, (b) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a
multiplicity of sources, and (c) promoting fair competition in the market for
television programming.6 9 On the Court's view, each of these was both
important and legitimate.
What is of particular interest is the fact that interests (a) and (b) are
connected with Madisonian aspirations. Thus in an especially significant step,
the Court suggested that a content-neutral effort to promote diversity may well
be justified. In its most straightforward endorsement of the Madisonian view,
the Court said that "assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of
information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it

65. Id. at 2468.
66. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (requmnng that speech regulation scrvc
important government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest).
67. 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
68. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
69. 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
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promotes values central to the First Amendment. '70 Hence the Court
expressed special concern, in a perhaps self-conscious echo of Red Lion, over
the cable operator's "gatekeeper[] control over most (if not all) of the
television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's home."' The
Court also emphasized "[t]he potential for abuse of this private power over a
central avenue of communication. ' 72 It stressed that the First Amendment
"does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas."73
On the other hand, the Court thought that it was impossible to decide the
case without a better factual record than had been developed thus far.74 As
it stood, the record was insufficient to show whether the must-carry rules
would serve these legitimate interests. Would local broadcasters actually be
jeopardized without the must-carry rules? Here we should return to the
possibility, of which the Court was surely aware, that the rules were really an
effort to favor the broadcasting industry, not to help viewers.
The Court suggested that courts should maintain a basic posture of
deference to Congress' predictive judgments. 75 In its view, judges should not
second-guess those judgments even if they distrust them. On the other hand,
Congress' judgments would face a form of independent judicial review,
designed to ensure that Congress had made "reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence. 76 The Court therefore remanded the case to the lower
court for factual findings on (a) the question whether cable operators would
refuse significant numbers of broadcast stations without the must-carry rules
and (b) the question whether broadcast stations, if denied carriage, would
deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail altogether.
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, also
deserves some discussion, since the opinion may have considerable future
importance in view of the obvious internal fragmentation of the Court on these
questions. Justice O'Connor insisted above all that the must-carry rules were
based on content.? To reach this conclusion, she investigated the Act and its
history to show that the nominally neutral measures were in fact designed to
promote local programming. In her view, the existence of content
discrimination was not decisive against the must-carry rules. It was still
necessary to see whether the government could bring forward a strong interest,
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
for this
76.
77.

Id. at 2470.
Id. at 2466.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2472.
Id. at 2471. This was Justice Stevens' major point; he would have affirmed rather than remanded
reason. See id. at 2473.
Id. at 2471.
Id. at 2479.
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and show that the regulation promoted that interest. But Justice O'Connor
found that the government could not meet its burden.
In Justice O'Connor's view, the interest in "localism" was insufficient
justification. 78 In words that have considerable bearing on what government
may do with any information superhighway:
It is for private speakers and listeners, not for the government, to
decide what fraction of their news and entertainment ought to be of
a local character and what fraction ought to be of a national (or
international) one. And the same is true of the interest in diversity of
viewpoints: While the government may subsidize speakers that it
thinks provide novel points of view, it may not restrict other speakers
on the theory that what they say is more conventional.79
Justice O'Connor referred independently to the interests in public-affairs
programming and educational programming, finding that these interests are
"somewhat weightier" than the interest in localism. But in her view, "it is a
difficult question whether they are compelling enough to justify restricting
other sorts of speech. ' ' o Because of the difficulty of that question, Justice
O'Connor did not say whether "the Government could set some channels aside
for educational or news programming."' (This is of course a central issue for
the future.)
In her view, the Act was too crudely tailored to be justified as an
educational or public-affairs measure. The Act did not neutrally favor
educational or public-affairs programming, since it burdened equally "CNN,
C-Span, the Discovery Channel, the New Inspirational Network, and other
channels with as much claim as PBS to being educational or related to public
affairs."82 Whether or not a neutral law favoring educational and publicaffairs programming could survive constitutional scrutiny, this Act could not,
for it was insufficiently neutral.
IV. THE TURNER MODEL

A. Description
I have noted that there have been two free speech traditions and two
principal models of free speech. The marketplace model eschews content
regulation; it is animated by the notion of consumer sovereignty. The
Madisonian model may permit and even welcome content regulation; it is
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2478.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2479.
Id.
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rooted in an understanding of political sovereignty. There is now a third
model-the Turner model-of what government may do. An interesting
question, not fully resolved by Turneritself, has to do with the extent to which
the Turner model will incorporate features of its predecessors.
The new model has four simple components. Under Turner, (a)
government may regulate (not merely subsidize) new speech sources so as to
ensure accessfor viewers who would otherwise be without free programming
and (b) government may require owners of speech sources to provide access
to speakers, at least if the owners are not conventional speakers too; but (c)
government must do all this on a content-neutral basis (at least as a general
rule); but (d) government may support its regulation not only by reference to
the provision of "access to free television programming" but also by invoking
such democratic goals as the need to ensure "an outlet for exchange on matters
of local concern" and "access to a multiplicity of information sources."8
Remarkably, every Justice on the Court appeared to accept (a), (b), and (c)
and parts of (d) (with minor qualifications). Perhaps the most notable feature
of the Court's opinion is its emphasis on the legitimacy and the importance of
ensuring general public (viewer) access to free programming. In this way, the
Court accepted at least a modest aspect of the Madisonian ideal, connected
with both political equality and broad dissemination of information. This
general goal is likely to have continuing importance in governmental efforts
to control the information superhighway so as to ensure viewer and listener
access. The Turner Court has put its stamp of approval on that goal. Recall in
particular that the government justified the must-carry rules on the theory that
without those rules, ordinary broadcasters would be unable to survive. The
consequence would be that people without cable would be without
broadcasting at all. The Court enthusiastically accepted this claim. It said that
"to preserve access to free television programming for the 40 percent of
Americans without cable" was a legitimate interest.' This holding suggests
that the government may provide access not only through subsidies, but also
through regulation.
On the other hand, the Court's quite odd refusal 85 to distinguish between
sections 4 and 5 and its use of the presumption against content discrimination
seem to support the marketplace model. Certainly the Court did not say that
it would be receptive to content discrimination if the discrimination were an
effort to promote attention to public affairs and exposure to diverse sources.
The Court did not claim or in any way imply that educational and publicaffairs programming could be required consistently with the First Amendment.
On the contrary, it suggested that it would view any content discrimination,
83. Id. at 2469-70.
84. Id. at 2479.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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with considerable
respect to whether
I will return to this

B. A Problem: Commerce vs. Public Affairs

The Court's major internal dispute involved the question whether the
content neutrality of the must-carry rules was impeached by the history
suggesting that Congress was particularly enthusiastic about local
programming. This is an issue on which reasonable people may disagree; it
turns largely on the extent to which statements in the legislative history will
be used to cast light on legislative goals. But the issue of content
discrimination seems, on inspection, to rest on a matter not discussed by
anyone on the Court; it is principally that matter, not the legislative history,
that raises special issues about content discrimination.
More concretely: From the standpoint of traditional free speech argument,
there is an obvious problem with the analysis offered by the Turner Court.
Section 4 and section 5 are quite different; they appear to have different
justifications. In any case, different carriage requirements in the two sections,
targeted to two different kinds of broadcasting, plainly reveal content
discrimination. The two sections explicitly define their correlative obligations
in terms of the nature, or content, of the programming. This is proof of content
discrimination.
How should that discrimination be handled? Under the Madisonian view,
there is all the difference in the world between section 4 and section 5. As I
have noted, section 5 imposes certain carriage requirements for educational and
public-affairs stations, whereas section 4 imposes different carriage
requirements for commercial stations. For Madisonians, section 5 stands on far
stronger ground, since it is apparently an effort to ensure education and
attention to public issues. It seems to serve straightforward democratic
functions. This does not mean that it is necessarily legitimate. Perhaps Justice
O'Connor's response-to the effect that section 5 does not adequately promote
that goal-is decisive as against a Madisonian defense of section 5. But section
4 appears to stand on far weaker ground from the Madisonian standpoint. Thus
Madisonians would distinguish between the two provisions and would be far
more hospitable toward section 5.86
In fact, the Court should have analyzed the two sections differently. The
validity of section 4 turned on whether the factual record could support the
86. See Monroe E. Price & Donald W. Hawthorne. Saving Public Television: The Remand of Turner
Broadcasting and the Future of Cable Regulation. 17 HI snNGcs COMM. & E ''. lJ. 65. 91-95 (1994), for
an argument that on remand, the district court should uphold section 5 cvcn if it finds section 4

unconstitutional.
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idea that the section was necessary to ensure the continued availability of free
public television. On this score the Court's basic solution-a remand-was
quite reasonable, even if the statute was treated as content-based. On remand,
the question would be whether content regulation of this sort was sufficiently
justified as a means of saving free public television.
The analysis for section 5 should be quite different. The provision of
educational and public-affairs programming is entirely legitimate, certainly if
there is no substantial intrusion on speakers who want to provide another kind
of programming.87 The validity of section 5 thus should have turned on
whether it was sufficiently tailored to the provision of educational and publicaffairs programming. Perhaps Justice O'Connor was right in doubting whether
adequate tailoring could be shown; in any case this is the issue to be decided.
In short, both provisions are content-based, but this phrase should not be used
as a talisman. The question was whether the content-based restrictions were
sufficiently connected with legitimate goals. An approach of this kind would
have been the most reasonable one to take.
On the other hand, within the marketplace model, the very existence of
two separate sections is problematic. Why should the government concern
itself with whether stations are commercial or noncommercial? Marketplace
advocates would find the Act objectionable simply by virtue of the fact that
it distinguishes between commercial and noncommercial stations. To them, the
fact that two different sectiong impose different carriage requirements shows
that there is content discrirmnation in the Act.
Under the two prevailing free speech models, then, it would make sense
either to treat section 5 along a different track from section 4 (the better
approach), or to question them both as content-discriminatory on their face.
Both of these approaches would have been quite plausible. Remarkably,
however, no Justice in Turner took either approach. Indeed, no Justice drew
any distinction at all between section 4 and section 5, and no Justice urged that
the existence of two different sections showed that there was content
discrimination.
This is a genuine puzzle. Why did no Justice invoke Madisonian goals to
treat section 5 more generously? Why did no Justice invoke content neutrality
to complain about the existence of two separate sections? As we have seen,
none of the parties raised the issue, and perhaps the question was not squarely
presented, permitting the Court to decide the case on a narrower and less
controversial ground. Under the approach of both the majority and the dissent,
it may not have been necessary to answer the hard questions of whether and
how government might promote educational and public-affairs programming.

87. Thus it could be imagined that a serious question would be raised if Congress said that a humor
magazine had to educate too, or that speakers on a comedy show had to have serious bits as well.
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But why did no Justice suggest that the two sections embodied content
discrimination? This question is much harder to answer.
Perhaps the Court had something like the following in mind. The two
sections involve speakers rather than speech; they point to the nature of the
station, not to the nature of the programming. Thus the Act may perhaps be
understood as imposing a speaker-based restriction of the sort that the Court
found legitimate insofar as the Act applied only to cable television.
On reflection, however, this response seems implausible. The kind of
speaker-based restriction reflected in the two sections has everything to do with
content. The definition of section 5 stations is inextricably intertwined with the
speech offered by such stations. So too with the definition of section 4
stations. The Court therefore appears to have blundered in failing to find
content discrimination in the existence of two separate sections. Perhaps the
content discrimination could have been justified if the Court had attended to
separate justifications for the two provisions, or at least the Court might have
upheld section 5 if it could have met Justice O'Connor's concerns. I return to
this point below.
C. A Paradoxand a ProvisionalSolution: Madisoniansand Marketeers vs.
Turner?
Now let us proceed to a larger matter. As I have noted, the Turner Court
did not accept a Madisonian model of free speech. The distinction between
content-based and content-neutral restrictions was crucial to the opinion, and
that distinction hardly emerges from a Madisonian model, which would carve
up the free speech universe in a different way. But the Court certainly did not
accept the marketplace model in its entirety. In addition to emphasizing the
legitimacy of ensuring access to free programming-and of doing so through
regulation rather than subsidy-the Court stressed more or less democratic
justifications for the must-carry rules, including broad exposure to
programming on public issues, and to a multiplicity of sources of information.
It might be argued both that Turner is insufficiently responsive to marketplace
concerns and that Turner is a Madisonian failure insofar as the Turner model
appears to do nothing about the problem of low-quality programming and
insufficient exposure to public debate.
1. The Paradox
An especially distinctive feature of the Court's opinion is its ambivalence
about the legitimacy of governmental efforts to promote diversity. There is
ambivalence on this score because while the Court invoked diversity as a goal,
it also made its skepticism about content-based regulation quite clear, and
many imaginable efforts to promote diversity are content-based. Consider the
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fairness doctrine as well as many European initiatives to promote diversity in
the media."8 The Court found it necessary to insist that Congress was not
trying, through the must-carry rules, to ensure exposure to local news sources.
On the other hand, the Court suggested that a content-neutral effort to
promote diversity may well be justified. Hence the Court offered a number of
justifications for regulation of cable technology. As we have seen, the Court
expressed concern over the cable operator's "gatekeeper[] control over most
(if not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's
home."8 9 The Court emphasized "[t]he potential for abuse of this private
power over a central avenue of communication."' The Court stressed that the
First Amendment "does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure
that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway
of communication, the free flow of information and ideas." 9' And thus the
Court emphasized "the importance of local broadcasting units" in promoting
attention to public issues.2 In these ways, the Turner opinion contains an
echo, albeit a faint one, of the highly Madisonian analysis in Red Lion..
There is therefore an important paradox at the heart of the Turner model.
The paradox emerges from (a) the presumptive invalidity of content-based
restrictions, accompanied by (b) the insistence by the Court on the legitimacy
of the goals of providing access to a multiplicity of sources and outlets for
exchanges on issues of local concern. This is a paradox because if these goals
are legitimate, content-based regulation designed to promote them might well
be thought legitimate too. If government may engage in content-neutral
restrictions designed self-consciously to provide access to many sources, why
may it not favor certain speech directly? The most natural way to provide
certain kinds of programming is through content-based regulation,"
2. Substantive Doctrine and Institutional Constraints
The question then arises: If diversity is a legitimate goal, why might the
Turnermodel be superior to the Madisonian model? One possible view is that
the Turner model is not superior, but that it should be regarded instead as a
cautious and incompletely theorized step 94 that appropriately leaves gaps for
88. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 77-81 (noting that several European high courts have found that
governments were not merely permitted to promote diversity in the media, but were constitutionally o~ligcd
to do so); see also EI NOAM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS INEUROPE (1992).
89. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2466 (1994).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2469.
93. Cf.Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding affirmative action for minority
owners on theory that this indirect, content-neutral approach would provide broadcasting of certain
content--even though nondiscriminatory alternative, pursuing that very same goal directly, would probably
be unconstitutional).
94. We might even see the outcome as an incompletely theorized agreement, a distinctive kind of
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future refinement. Perhaps the Turner model will have to be elaborated, as it
clearly can be, to make clear that well-tailored efforts to promote diversity and
broader democratic goals are legitimate even if they are content-based.
For reasons to be suggested, this would indeed be a sensible step. But
there is another point. Despite appearances, there is good reason for the Turner
Court's skepticism toward content-based regulation, and the reason operates by
reference to institutional considerations involving the distinctive characteristics
of judge-made doctrine. Those considerations have everything to do with the
potential superiority of (not entirely accurate) rules of law over highly
individuated, case-by-case judgments. This defense of Turner says not that the
case reflects the best understanding of the substantive content of the free
speech principle, but that it may be the best way for the Supreme Court to
police that principle in light of its institutional limits.
In brief: In light of the nature of the current electronic media, in which
scarcity is a decreasing problem, a presumptive requirement of content
neutrality may well be the best way for judges to police objectionable
governmental purposes, especially in the form of viewpoint discrimination."
If government favors speech of certain kinds through content regulation, there
is always a risk that it is actually trying to favor certain views. For example,
a regulatory requirement of discussion of abortion, or race relations, or
feminism would raise serious fears to the effect that government is seeking to
promote certain positions. Through insisting on content neutrality-again, at
least as a presumption--courts can minimize the risk of impermissibly
motivated legislation, and they can do so while limiting the institutional burden
faced by judges making more individualized judgments. The presumption in
favor of content neutrality has the fortunate consequence of making it
unnecessary for courts to answer hard case-by-case questions about the
legitimacy of diverse initiatives, many of which will, predictably, be based on
illegitimate motivations.
We might thus offer a cautious defense of the Turner model over the
Madisonian model. The defense would depend on the view that the Turner
model may well best combine the virtues of (a) judicial administrability (a real
problem for Madisonians%), (b) appreciation of the risk of viewpoint
discrimination (a real problem for Madisonians too), and (c) an understanding
of the hazards of relying on markets alone (addressed by Turner insofar as the
Court allows Congress considerable room to maneuver). For this reason, the

judicial judgment. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements. 108 HARv. L

REV.

(forthcoming May 1995).
95. See the valuable analysis in Elena Kagan. Private Speech. Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), on wuch
I draw for this and the preceding paragraph.
96. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 21.
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Turner model may well be better, at least in broad outline, than the
Madisonian and marketplace alternatives.
3.

Countervailing Considerations

There are important countervailing considerations. As indicated above,'
the application of the Turner model to technologies other than cable raises
serious problems, for cable presents the special question of "bottleneck
control." Many of the other new technologies raise questions not involving
anything like "bottleneck control," which was central to the resolution in
Turner. In general, regulation of the Internet raises no such problem. In
Turner, moreover, the principal access issue was the right to hear; in other
cases, the central issue, also one of access, will involve the right to speak.
Sometimes the principal question will be whether certain speakers can have
access to certain audiences. In other contexts, regulatory efforts may involve
educational goals more straightforwardly, as in guarantees of free media time
to candidates or in provisions to ensure public-affairs programming or
programming for children.
As I have argued, moreover, speech should not be treated as a simple
commodity, especially in a period dominated by attention to sensationalistic
scandals and low-quality fare. 98 In light of the cultural consequences of
broadcasting-through, for example, its effects on democratic processes and
children's education-we should not think of electronic media as "just...
appliance[s]," or as "toaster[s] with pictures." 99 At least part of the First
Amendment inquiry should turn on the relationship between what broadcasters
provide and what a well-functioning democracy requires. If we have any
sympathy for Brandeis' judgment-shared by Madison'--that "the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people," we will acknowledge that the
marketplace model may not perform an adequate educative role, and that a
system of free markets may well disserve democratic ideals.
Of course there are hard issues about which bodies are authorized to
decide what programming ought to be offered.'0 ' But the Turner model is
vulnerable insofar as it brackets the deeper issues and addresses Madisonian
concerns with the useful but crude doctrinal categories "content-based" and
"content-neutral." Those categories are crude because they are not tightly

97. See the introduction to Part I supra.
98. There is of course a large and insufficiently analyzed problem: defining the relevant market.
Perhaps those interested in Madisonian goals should focus on the entirety of the free speech market, seeing
magazines, broadcasting, and even books as aspects of a single market, to be taken as a whole. I cannot
address this issue here.
99. See Nossiter, supra note 3.
100. See supra text accompanying note 1.
101. See KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 25 (stressing this problem).
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connected with any plausible conception of the basic point or points of a
system of free speech.
Some qualifications of the Turner model, pointing in Madisonian
directions, are therefore desirable. The majority does not foreclose such
qualifications, and Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion actually makes some
space for arguments of this sort. I will suggest some important qualifications
that are nonetheless consistent with the general spirit of Turner itself.
V. SPEECH, EMERGING MEDIA, AND CYBERSPACE

A. New Possibilitiesand New Problems: Referenda in Cyberspace and
Related Issues
It should be unnecessary to emphasize that the explosion of new
technologies opens up extraordinary new possibilities. As the Department of
Commerce's predictions suggest, ordinary people might ultimately participate
in a communications network in which hundreds of millions of people, or
more, can communicate with each other and indeed with all sorts of service
providers-libraries, doctors, accountants, lawyers, legislators, shopkeepers,
pharmacies, grocery stores, museums, Internal Revenue Service employees,
restaurants, and more. If you need an answer to a medical question, you may
be able to push a few buttons and receive a reliable answer. If you want to
order food for delivery, you would be able to do so in a matter of seconds. If
you have a question about sports or music or clothing, or about the eighteenth
century, you could get an instant answer. People can now purchase many
goods on their credit cards without leaving home. It may soon be possible to
receive a college education without leaving home.'02 As I have suggested,
the very notions of "location" and "home" will change in extraordinary ways.
Many of the relevant changes have already occurred. Consider the fact that
in 1989, there were about 47.5 million cable television subscribers, accounting
for 52.5% of television households-whereas by 1995, there were 59 million
subscribers, accounting for 61.8% of television households.'0 3 Consider the
following chart:" °

102. See In 2050, Computers May Be Collegian's "'Campus**.CHI. TRIB.. Nov. 7. 1994. at4. Itis
revealing that many of the footnotes in this Essay come from newspapers and weekly news magazines.
With respect to communications technologies, development is occurring so rapidly that other sources are
often obsolete upon publication.
103. See DirecTv a Big Hit, supra note 27.
104. Id
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Millions of
TV
Households

Millions
of Homes
Passed
by Cable

Homes
Passed
as a %
of TV
Homes

Millions of
Cable
Households

Cable
Subscribers
as a % of
Homes
Passed

Cable
Penetration
of TV
Households
(%)

1989

90.4

80.0

88.5

47.5

59.4

52.5

1990

92.1

84.4

91.6

50.5

59.8

54.8

1991

93.1

87.2

93.7

52.6

60.3

56.5

1992

92.1'05

88.9

96.5

54.3

61.1

59.0

1993

93.1

90.1

96.8

56.2

62.4

60.4

1994

94.2

91.3

96.9

57.2

62.7

60.7

1995

95.4

92.5

97.0

59.0

63.8

61.8

TABLE 1.

The number of subscribers to major online services is also increasing
rapidly, with 6.3 million American subscribers."6 Consider also the
following chart:' 0 7
Number of Users

Technology

30-40 million

Internet
CompuServe

2,700,000

America Online

2,300,000

Prodigy

2,000,000
11,000

The WELL
Women's Wire

1300
TABLE 2.

The forerunners of the "information superhighway" are thus increasingly
available to large numbers of people. In this Section, I discuss some large and
general questions about communications in a democracy; I turn to more
specific policy issues in Sections B and C.
105. Revised downward based on 1990 census.
106. On-Line Computer Services HadAnother Boom Year Survey Says, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1995,

at D2.
107. This chart was compiled on the basis of data in John Flinn, The Line on On-Line Services, S.F.
EXAMINER, Mar. 1, 1995, at BI, and Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Welcome to Cyberspace, TIME, Spring 1995
(Special Issue), at 9. In some countries the number of Internet users has grown more than 1000% in the
past three years. Id.
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1. Economics and Democracy
Technological developments enjoyed by so many people bring with them
extraordinary promise and opportunities from the standpoints of both
Madisonianism and the marketplace. From nearly 'o any point of view,
nostalgia for preexisting speech markets makes little sense.
The economic point is obvious, for the costs of transacting-of obtaining
information and entering into mutually beneficial deals-will decrease
enormously, and hence it will be much easier for consumers to get what they
want, whatever it is that they want. To say the least, a shopping trip-for
groceries, books, medicines, housing, trial transcripts, clothing--vill be much
simpler than it now is; it may well be significantly simpler now than it was
when this Essay was first written'0 9 In these ways the new information
technologies are a great boon.
At the same time, and equally important, there are potential democratic
gains, since communication among citizens and between citizens and their
representatives will be far easier. Citizens may be able to express their views
to public officials and to receive answers more effectively. To state a view or
ask a question on the issue of the day, no town meeting need be arranged.
High-quality, substantive discussions may well be possible among large
numbers of people; town meetings that are genuinely deliberative may become
commonplace. Voting may occur through the Internet. This is one of the most
intriguing features of cyberspace." 0 It will be possible to obtain a great deal
of information about candidates and their positions.
In fact much of this has already occurred. The practice of journalism has
changed in the sense that reporters communicate regularly with readers."'
Before the 1994 elections, public library computers delivered considerable
2
information about the candidates via the World Wide Web of the Internet.1"
The Web also allows people to see photographs of candidates and to have
access to dozens of pages of information about them and their positions. The
Web may be used nationally for these purposes as early as 1996. A number of
elected officials-in the White House, the Senate, and the House-now have
e-mail addresses and communicate with their constituents in cyberspace.
In Minnesota, five candidates for governor and three candidates for the
senate participated in debates on electronic mail." 3 In 1993, President
108. The qualification is necessary because of threats posed by the new technologies to the possibiltty
of commonly shared experience and to exposure to positions contrary to one's own. See infra text

accompanying notes 121-28.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Barrett Seaman, The Future Is Already Here. TIME. Spring 1995 (Special Issue), at 30-33
See generally RHEINGOLD, supra note 6.
See David S. Jackson, Extra! Readers Talk Back'. TIME. Spring 1995 (Special Issue), at 60.
Peter H. Lewis, Voters and Candidates Meet on Informaton Superhughwav. N.Y TIMoS. Nov

6, 1994, at 30.
113. Id.
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Clinton established connections with millions of e-mail users, putting his
address into their system and inviting them to give reactions on public issues.
Candidates generally are obtaining and publicizing e-mail addresses." 4 Thus
presidential candidate Lamar Alexander launched his campaign with a forum
via America Online, in which he spoke to all those who chose to join the
forum." 5 The Madisonian framework was based partly on the assumption
that large-scale substantive discussions would not be practicable." 6
Technology may well render that assumption anachronistic.
The result may be of particular benefit for people of moderate or low
income. People without substantial means may nonetheless make their views
heard. So too relatively poor candidates may be able to communicate more
cheaply." 7 In this way the new communications technologies may relieve
some of the pressure for campaign finance restrictions by promoting the
Madisonian goal of political equality."' In the midst of economic inequality,
perhaps technological advances can make political equality a more realistic
goal."

19

Moreover, education about public issues will be much simpler and cheaper.
The government, and relevant interest groups, will be able to state their cases
far more easily. And after touching a few buttons, people will be able to have
access to substantial information about policy dilemmas-possible wars,
environmental risks and regulations, legal developments, trials, medical reform,
and a good deal more. Consider as simply one example, the astonishing service
LEXIS Counsel Connect. With this service a lawyer can have access to
essentially all proposed laws. A lawyer can also join substantive "discussion
groups," dealing with, for example, the Simpson trial, recent tax developments,
risk regulation, securities arbitration, affirmative action, LEXIS Counsel
Connect, cyberspace, the First Amendment in cyberspace, and much more. The
proliferation of law-related discussion groups on law-related topics is one tiny
illustration of a remarkable cultural development. Thus the Usenet includes
physics, ring-tailed
more than 10,000 discussion groups, dealing with particle
20
others.
countless
among
Limbaugh,
Rush
and
lemurs,
114. See Howard Fineman with Stephen A. Tuttle, The Brave New World ofCybertribes,NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 27, 1995, at 30-33.
115. See id. at 30.
116. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
117. See Lewis, supra note 112.
118. Thus Madison listed "establishing a political equality among all" as the first means of combatting
the "evil" of parties. See James Madison, Parties, NAT'L GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1792, reprinted in 14 Ti
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197-98 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). On the risks of government by
referendum, see DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIREcr LEGISLATION (1984).

119. See the discussion of Vice President Gore's proposals in RHEINGOLD, supra note 6. at 304, which
calls for avoiding "information haves" and "have-nots."
120. Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 107, at 4, 9-10. A special advantage of the Internet is its grassroots,
"bottom-up" quality. In contrast to the mass media, in which a large broadcaster speaks to millions, the
Internet allows individual citizens to spread news or commentary to one person, or to hundreds, or to
thousands, or to millions. The problem of access to the media is in this respect greatly reduced. A
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2. Dangers
At least from the
of democratic theory,
There are two major
second is an increase

standpoint of the founding era, and from the standpoint
the new technology also carries with it significant risks.
problems. The first is an absence of deliberation. The
in social balkanization.

a. Absence of Deliberation
The Madisonian view of course places a high premium on public
deliberation, and it disfavors immediate and inadequately considered
governmental reactions to pressures from the citizenry.' 2' The American
polity is a republic, not a direct democracy, and for legitimate reasons; direct
democracy is unlikely to provide successful governance, for it is too likely to
be free from deliberation and unduly subject to short-time reactions and sheer
manipulation. From the inception of the American system a large point of the
system of republicanism has been to "refine and enlarge the public view"
through the system of representation."
This process of refinement and enlargement is endangered by decreased
costs of communication. As I have noted, discussions in cyberspace may well
be both substantive and deliberative; electronic mail and the Internet in
particular hold out considerable promise on this score.' 3 But
communications between citizens and their representatives may also be reactive
to short-term impulses, and may consist of simple referenda results
insufficiently filtered by reflection and discussion.
In the current period, there is thus a serious risk that low-cost or costless
communication will increase government's responsiveness to myopic or poorly
considered public outcries, or to sensationalistic or sentimental anecdotes that
are a poor basis for governance. Although the apparent presence of diverse
public voices is often celebrated, electoral campaigns and treatment of public
issues already suffer from myopia and sensationalism," - and in a way that
compromises founding ideals. On this count it is hardly clear that new
technologies will improve matters. They may even make things worse. The
phenomenon of "talk radio" has achieved considerable attention in this regard.
It is surely desirable to provide forums in which citizens can speak with one
decentralized system has the distinct virtue of promoting Jeffersonian aspirauons to citizenshtp
121. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); see also JOSEPH M. BESsErE.T"HE MILD VOICE
OF REASON (1994).
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
123. See supra textaccompanying note 120 (discussing LEXIS Counsel Connect); see also
RHEINGOLD, supra note 6.
124. See generallySHANTO IYENGAR, Is ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? (1992); SHTo IYENGAR & DONALD
R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS (1987); PHYLLIS KANISS. MAKING LOCAL NEWS (1989). See also
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 33-51 (1993).
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another, especially on public issues. But it is not desirable if government
officials are reacting to immediate reactions to misleading or sensationalistic
presentations of issues.
Ross Perot's conception of an "electronic town meeting" is hardly
consistent with founding aspirations, at least if the meeting has the power to
make decisions all by itself. Democracy by soundbite is hardly a perfect ideal.
New technologies may make democracy by soundbite far more likely.
Everything depends on how those technologies are deployed in communicating
to public officials.
We can make these points more vivid with a thought experiment. Imagine
that through the new technologies, the communications options were truly
limitless. Each person could design his own communications universe. Each
person could see those things that he wanted to see, and only those things.
Insulation from unwelcome material would be costless. Choice of particular
subjects and points of view would be costless too. Would such a system be a
communications utopia? Would it fulfill First Amendment aspirations?'5
The answer is by no means simple. Of course a system of this kind would
have advantages. It might well overcome some of the problems produced by
extremes of wealth and poverty, at least insofar as poor people could both
speak and hear far more cheaply. But the aspiration to an informed citizenry
may not be well served. Under the hypothesized system, perhaps most people
would be rarely or poorly informed. Perhaps their consumption choices would
disserve democratic ideals. 2 6 If the system of free expression is designed to
ensure against an "inert people," we cannot know, a priori, whether a system
of well-functioning free markets would be desirable.
b. Balkanization and Self-Insulation
The hypothesized system would have another problem: It would allow
people to screen out ideas, facts, or accounts of facts that they find disturbing.
In the current system, people are often confronted with ideas and facts that
they find uncongenial. This is an important democratic good; it promotes
education and discussion. A well-functioning system of free expression is one
in which people are exposed to ideas that compete with their own, so that they
can test their own views and understand other perspectives even when they
disagree. This process can produce a capacity for empathy and understanding,
so that other people are not dehumanized even across sharp differences in
judgment and perspective. Important forms of commonality and respect might
emerge simply by virtue of presenting the perspectives of others from others'
points of view.
125. For a description of the possibility of such a system, see Volokh, supra note 29.
126. On the issue of choice, see infra part V.B.2.
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A system of individually designed communications options could, by
contrast, result in a high degree of balkanization, in which people are not
presented with new or contrary perspectives. Such a nation could not easily
satisfy democratic and deliberative goals. In such a nation, communication
among people with different perspectives might be far more difficult than it
now is; mutual intelligibility may become difficult or even impossible. In such
a nation, there may be little commonality among people with diverse
commitments, as one group caricatures another or understands it by means of
simple slogans that debase reality and eliminate mutual understanding.
These suggestions are far from hypothetical. They capture a significant part
of the reality of current communications in America. They create serious
political risks.
3. A CautionAbout Responses
It is far from clear how government can or should overcome these various
problems. Certainly government should not be permitted to censor citizen
efforts to communicate with representatives, even if such communications
carry risks to deliberative ideals. It does seem clear, however, that government
should be cautious about spurring on its own the use of new technologies to
promote immediate, massive public reactions to popular issues. Government
by referendum is at best a mixed blessing, with possible unfortunate
consequences wherever it is tried. 127 The electronic media should not be used
to create a form of government by referendum. Regulatory efforts to facilitate
communication need not be transformed into an effort to abandon republican
goals.
Rather than spurring referenda in cyberspace, or referenda by soundbite,
government should seek to promote deliberation and reflection as part of the
process of eliciting popular opinion.' 2 Any such efforts might well be made
part of a general strategy for turning new communications technologies to
constitutional ends. As we have seen, electronic mail has considerable promise
on this score.
B. Some Policy Dilemmas
A large question for both constitutional law and public policy has yet to
receive a full democratic or a judicial answer: To what extent, if any, do
Madisonian ideals have a place in the world of new technologies, or in
cyberspace? Some people think that the absence of scarcity eliminates the
127. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 118.
128. See the discussion of the deliberative opinion poll in JAMES S. FISHKIN. DFMOCRACY AND
DELIBERATION 1-2, 84 (1991).
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argument for governmental regulation, at least if it is designed to promote
attention to public issues, to increase diversity, or to raise the quality of public
debate. 129 If outlets are unlimited, why is regulation of any value? In the
future, people will be able to listen to whatever they want, perhaps to speak
to whomever they choose. Ought this not to be a constitutional ideal?
The question is meant to answer itself, but perhaps enough has been said
to show that it hardly does that. Recall first that structural regulation, assigning
property rights and making agreements possible, is a precondition for wellfunctioning markets. Laissez-faire is a hopeless misdescription of free markets.
A large government role, with coercive features, is required to maintain
markets. Part of the role also requires steps to prevent monopoly and
monopolistic practices.
Moreover, Madisonian goals need not be thought anachronistic in a period
of infinite outlets. In a system of infinite outlets, the goal of consumer
sovereignty may well be adequately promoted. That goal has a distinguished
place in both law and public policy. But it should not be identified with the
Constitution's free speech guarantee. The Constitution does not require
consumer sovereignty; for the most part, the decision whether to qualify or
replace that goal with Madisonian aspirations should be made democratically
rather than judicially. A democratic citizenry armed with a constitutional
guarantee of free speech need not see consumer sovereignty as its fundamental
aspiration. 3 Certainly it may choose consumer sovereignty if it likes. But
it may seek instead to ensure high-quality fare for children, even if this
approach departs from consumer satisfaction. It may seek more generally to
promote educational and public-affairs programming.
The choice between these alternatives should be made through the political
branches rather than as a matter of constitutional law. In this Section, I try to
support this basic conclusion, and to do so in a way that is attuned to many of
the pathologies of "command-and-control" regulation. The goal for the future
is to incorporate Madisonian aspirations in a regulatory framework that is alert
to the difficulty of anticipating future tastes and developments, that sees that
incentives are better than commands, and that attempts to structure future
change rather than to dictate its content.

129. See KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 25.
130. It is revealing in this regard that many European nations do not identify their free speech
principle with consumer sovereignty. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 77-81. The experience of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) is of special interest, for the Court has selfconsciously decided that democratic aspirations require the government to regulate the broadcast media to
create a forum for speakers with a broad range of interests and opinions. See DAVID P. CURRIE, Tti
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 227-33 (1994); CAss R. SUNSTIN, supra note

12, at 77-79 (discussing recent Bundesverfassungsgerichtcases).
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1. Advertising
It is commonly thought that viewers and listeners purchase a
communications product, and that their purchase decisions should be respected;
but this picture is not altogether right. The decisions of viewers and listeners
are different from most consumption decisions, in the sense that viewers and
listeners often pay nothing for programming, and often they are, in a sense, the
product that is being sold. For much commercial programming, a key source
of revenues is advertisers, and programmers deliver viewers to advertisers in
return for money. For this reason the broadcasting market is not a conventional
one in which people purchase their preferred products. People's viewing and
listening time is bought and sold.
There is an important consequence for the substantive content of
broadcasting: What is provided in a communications market is not the same
as what viewers would like to see. Advertisers have some power over the
content of communication, for they may withdraw their support from
disfavored programming. They may withdraw their support not simply because
the programming does not attract viewers, but also because (a) the
programming is critical of the particular advertisers, (b) it is critical of
commerce is general, (c) it stirs up a controversial reaction from some part of
the audience, or (d) it is "depressing" or creates "an unfavorable buying
atmosphere." There is a great deal of evidence that advertiser control does
affect the content of programming. 3' Controversial programs have been
punished; presentations of contested issues, such as abortion, have been
affected by advertisers' goals.' 32

In an era of numerous options, the influence of advertising over
programming content should be less troublesome, since controversial points of
view should find an outlet. Certainly there is no such problem on the Internet.
But there will nonetheless continue to be a structural problem in broadcasting
markets, since viewers' demand for programs will not be fully responsible for
the programs that are actually provided. Many imaginable proposals could help
counter this problem. Such proposals should not be found unconstitutional even
33
if consumer sovereignty is the overriding policy goal.'
2.

"Choice" and Culture

If we put the questions raised by advertisers to one side, we might urge
that there is a decisive argument in favor of the marketplace model and against
Madisonianism. The marketplace ideal values "choice," whereas the
131. See the extensive discussion in BAKER. supra note 37. at 44-70; see also SUNSTE1.

12, at 62-66.
132. See BAKER, supra note 37, at 55-65.
133. See id. at 83-117.
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Madisonian alternative can be seen to reflect a form of dangerous paternalism,34
or disrespect for people's diverse judgments about entertainment options
Perhaps Madisonianism is illiberal insofar as it does not respect the widely
divergent conceptions of the good that are reflected in consumption choices.
The argument is certainly plausible. In most arenas, consumers are allowed
to choose as they wish, and governmental interference requires special
justification. But in this context, at least, the argument from choice is quite
unconvincing, for it wrongly takes people's consumption choices as definitive
or exhaustive of "choice." In fact the notion of "choice" is a complex one that
admits of no such simple understanding. 35 In a democratic society, people
make choices as citizens too. They make choices in democratic arenas as well
as in stores and before their computers. What those choices are depends on the
context in which they are made.
For this reason, the insistence on respect for "choice," as a defense of the
marketplace model, sets up the legal problem in a question-begging way.
People do make choices as consumers, and these choices should perhaps be
respected. But those choices are heavily geared to the particular setting in
which they are made-programming consumption. They do not represent some
acontextual entity called "choice." In fact there is no such acontextual
6
entity.
The question is not whether or not to respect "choice," but what sorts of
choices to respect. More particularly, the question is whether to allow
democratic choices to make inroads on consumption choices. In a free society,
consumption choices should usually be respected. But the Constitution does not
require this result, and in some settings democratic judgments contrary to
consumption choices are legitimate. For example, a requirement that
broadcasters provide free media time for candidates might well receive broad
public support, even if viewers would, at the relevant time, opt for commercial
programming. 37 There should be no constitutional barrier to such a
requirement.
The central point is that in their capacity as citizens assessing the speech
market, people may well make choices, or offer considered judgments, that
diverge from their choices as consumers. 3 Acting through their elected
representatives, the public may well seek to promote (for example) educational
134. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.c.R. 5043, 5052 (1987);
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 25.

135. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 190-216 (1993).

136. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHIi. L. REv.
1, 78-79 (1995); Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 ECONOMErRICA 495 (1993).
137. Of course it is possible that any regulatory requirements would be futile, since people might
simply change the channel, or cease watching at all. This may be a good objection, as a matter of policy,
to any particular initiative. The important point is that it is an objection of policy, not of constitutional law.
138. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY (1987); Cass R. Sunstein,

Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991).
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programming, attention to public issues, and diverse views. Perhaps the
public-or a majority acting in its democratic capacity-believes that education
and discussion of public issues are both individual and collective goods. Any
system of expression has cultural consequences; it helps create and sustain a
certain kind of culture. Perhaps the public wants to ensure a culture of a
certain sort, notwithstanding consumption choices. 39 Perhaps it seeks to
protect children and adolescents, and sees regulation of broadcasting as a way
of accomplishing that goal. Perhaps people believe that their own consumption
choices are less than ideal, and that for justice-regarding or altruistic reasons,
or because of their basic commitments and judgments, regulations should force
broadcasters or cable operators to improve on existing low-quality fare.
Perhaps people seek and hence choose to ensure something like a political
community, not in the sense of a place where everyone believes the same
thing, but in the sense of a polity in which people are generally aware of the
issues that are important to the future of the polity. Perhaps people think that
the broadcasting media should have a degree of continuity with the educational
system, in the sense that broad dissemination of knowledge and exposure to
different views are part of what citizens in a democratic polity deserve.
Perhaps people believe that many citizens do not value certain high-quality
programming partly because they have not been exposed to it, and perhaps
experiments are designed to see if tastes for such programming can be fueled
through exposure.' 40

Would measures stimulated by such thoughts be objectionable, illegitimate,
or even unconstitutional? Would they interfere in an impermissible way with
something called "choice"? I do not believe so. Surely any such efforts should
be policed by courts, so as to ensure that government is not discriminating
against or in favor of certain viewpoints. The mere fact that the democratic
majority seeks to overcome consumption choices is not legitimating by itself;
the democratic judgment may be unacceptable if it involves viewpoint
discrimination or content discrimination suggestive of viewpoint bias. But
rightly conceived, our constitutional heritage does not disable the public, acting
through the constitutional channels, from improving the operation of the speech
market in the ways that I have suggested. Whether it should do so is a
question to be answered democratically rather than judicially.

139. Compare the discussion of the right to free speech in RAz. supra note 32. at 131-54.
If I were to choose between living in a society which enjoys freedom of expression. but not
having the right myself, or enjoying the right in a society which does not have it. I would have
no hesitation in judging that my own personal interest is better served by the first option.
Id. at 39.
140. Cf. JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPEs (1983) (discussing adaptive preferences); Sushil Bikhchandanm
et al., A Theory of Fads Fashion, Custom and Culture Change as Informational Cascades. 100 L POL
EcON. 992 (1992) (theorizing that because decisions based upon limited information are fragile, relatively
unimportant new information may radically shift social equilibria).
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3. Analogies
An important issue for the future involves the use of old analogies in novel
settings. The new technologies will greatly increase the opportunities for
intrusive, fraudulent, harassing, threatening, libelous, or obscene speech.'
With a few brief touches of a finger, a speaker is now be able to communicate
to thousands or even millions of people-or to pinpoint a message, perhaps a
commercial, harassing, threatening invasive message, to a particular person. A
libelous message, or grotesque invasions of privacy, can be sent almost
costlessly. Perhaps reputations and lives will be easily ruined or at least
damaged. There are difficult questions about the extent to which an owner of
a computer service might be held liable for what appears on that service.' 4 2
At this stage, it remains unclear whether the conventional legal standards
should be altered to meet such problems. For the most part, those standards
generally seem an adequate start and must simply be adapted to new settings.
For purposes of assessing cyberspace, there are often apt analogies on which
to draw. In fact the legal culture has no way to think about the new problems
except via analogies. The analogies are built into our very language: e-mail,
electronic bulletin boards, cyberspace, cyberspaces,' 43 and much more.'"4
Thus, for example, ordinary mail provides a promising foundation on
which to build the assessment of legal issues associated with electronic mail.
It is far from clear that the standards for libelous or fraudulent communication
must shift with the new technologies. To be sure, there will be new and
somewhat vexing occasions for evaluating the old standards. Judges may not
understand the novel situations, especially those involving the Internet. In
particular, the low cost of sending and receiving electronic mail, and of
sending it to thousands or millions of people, may produce some new
developments and put high pressure on old categories. Certainly it is likely that
new and unanticipated problems will arise and a degree of judicial caution is
therefore desirable in invoking the First Amendment. But it is by no means
clear that the basic principles will themselves have to be much changed.
4. Access
I have noted that the government has said that "universal access" is one
of its goals for the information superhighway. The question of access has
141. See, e.g., Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the
FirstAmendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE LJ. 1639 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw,
104 YALE LJ. 1743 (1995); Volokh, supra note 29.
142. See infra note 169, discussing S. 314, the proposed Communications Decency Act of 1995.
143. See Branscomb, supra note 141.
144. See Lessig, supra note 141, at 1744; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, PoliticalConflict and Legal Judgment, 1996 ThE TANNER
LEcTUREs IN HUMAN VALUES (forthcoming).
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several dimensions. To some extent it is designed to ensure access to
broadcasting options for viewers and listeners-the central problem in Turner.
Here a particular concern is that poor people should not be deprived of access
to a valuable good. Currently the expense of Internet connections is
prohibitively high for many families. This may entail a form of
disenfranchisement and to some extent the problem is to ensure access for
certain speakers who want to reach part of the viewing or listening public. In
cyberspace, of course, people are both listeners and speakers.
Perhaps the goal of universal viewer or listener access should be viewed
with skepticism. The government does not guarantee universal access to cars,
or housing, or food, or even health care. It may seem puzzling to suggest that
universal access to information technologies is an important social goal. But
the suggestion can be shown to be less puzzling than it appears. Suppose, for
example, that a certain network becomes a principal means by which people
communicate with their elected representatives; suppose that such
communications become a principal part of public deliberation and in that way
ancillary to the right to vote. Suppose too that companies engage in a form of
"electronic redlining," in which they bypass poorer areas, both rural and in the
inner city. 4 5 We know that a poll tax is unconstitutional because of its
harmful effects on political equality.'" On a broadly similar principle,
universal access to the network might be thought desirable. To be sure, such
access would be most unlikely to be constitutionally mandated, since the right
to vote is technically not involved. But universal access could be seen to be
part of the goal of political equality. More generally, universal access might
be necessary if the network is to serve its intended function of promoting
broad discussion between citizens and representatives. It is notable that at least
seven million Americans, 47most of whom are poor, lack telephones, and hence
are without basic access.
The point might be generalized. For any particular speaker, part of the
advantage of having access to a certain means of communication is that
everyone, or almost everyone, or a wide range of people, can be reached. The
Postal Service, for example, is justified in part on the ground that a national
system of mail is necessary or at least helpful for those who send mail; we can
be assured that any letter can reach everyone. The claim is controversial. But
perhaps a requirement of universal access can be justified not as an
inefficient' 48 effort to subsidize people who would be without service, but
on the quite different ground that universal service is a way of promoting the
145. Suneel Ratan. A New Divide Between Haves and Have-Nots?. TIME Spring 1995 (Special Issue).
at 25, 26.
146. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663. 666 (1966).
147. See Ratan, supra note 145, at 26.
148. It is likely to be inefficient when compared with subsidies for people who are unable to afford
access.
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communicative interests of those who already have service, The interests of the
latter group may well be promoted by ensuring that they can reach everyone,
or nearly everyone.
Arguments of this kind have been used throughout the history of
telecommunications regulation. For most of the twentieth century, there have
been cross-subsidies, as local companies with local monopolies have charged
high prices to certain customers (usually businesses) with which they
subsidized less profitable services. Perhaps a similar model would make sense
for modem technologies. The issue is already receiving considerable public
attention. 149
There are, however, significant inefficiencies in this model of crosssubsidization, 5 and a system of open-ended competition may well be better
than one based on universal access. It may be that open-ended competition will
provide universal access in any case, or something very close to it. Or it may
be that open-ended competition, combined with selective subsidies, would be
better than the regulatory approach. This question cannot easily be answered
in the abstract. Certainly debate over universal access should not be resolved
by constitutional fiat. This is an area for public debate and a large degree of
experimentation.
5. Incentives Rather than Command-and-Control
In general, any regulatory controls should take the form of flexible
incentives rather than rigid commands. Command-and-control systems are
usually ineffective in achieving their own goals; they tend to promote interestgroup power, in which well-organized private groups are able to use
governmental authority to redistribute wealth or opportunities in their favor;
they also tend to be inefficient. 5 '
I cannot discuss this issue in detail here, but the explosion of new
technologies reinforces the point. It is predictable that owners of some services
will attempt to obtain governmental aid to disadvantage actual or potential
competitors.152 Especially in an era of rapid and only partly foreseeable
technological change, the government's basic duty is to provide a framework
for competitive development, 5 3 rather than specification of end-states. Any
149. See Vice President Gore's suggestions, outlined in RHEINGOLD, supra note 6, at 11.
150. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM (1982).

151. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 13
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 171 (1988). A vigorous popular treatment is PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF
COMMON SENSE (1994). FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTrrTUION OF LIBERTY (1960), can well be read
as a sustained attack on command-and-control regulation, and what Hayek says bears directly on efforts
to regulate emerging technologies.
152. See, e.g., The Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp. V 1993); supra text accompanying notes
54-55.
153. This is a Hayekian point connected with the difficulty of foreseeing the future. See HAYEK, supra
note 151.
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such specifications will likely prove counterproductive in light of developments
that cannot now be predicted.
This is not to say that government regulation has no place, or even that
government should restrict itself to the task of ensuring well-functioning
markets. But even good Madisonians should insist that rigid dictates ought to
be avoided. Regulation will do far better if it takes the form of incentives
rather than mandates. Consider, as possible forerunners of future approaches,
the FCC's use of auction systems accompanied by the grant of "points" toward
licensing' 54 for preferred licensees. Consider too the use of government
subsidies to public broadcasting or to certain high-quality programs, or the
transfer of resources from commercial broadcasters for the benefit of
noncommercial, educational, or public-affairs programming. Initiatives of this
sort would not mandate particular results but instead would create pressures to
improve the speech market.
C. Law
The ultimate shape of constitutional constraints on regulation of the
electronic media cannot be foreseen. Too many new possibilities will come
into view. Too many distinctions will become relevant. Consider, for example,
the fact that for many dozens of years, there has been a clear difference
between two different kinds of communication. The first is ordinary
broadcasting or publishing, in which an owner makes available a certain range
of communications; offers that range of communications as an indivisible
package for hundreds, thousands, or millions of subscribers; and sells
advertising time for commercial interests. The second involves the mail, in
which one person typically sends a message to another, or in which one person
might send a message to a group of people; in any case mail involves highly
differentiated, rather than indivisible, communication, in the sense that no
single "package" is made available to wide ranges of people. Moreover, no
advertisers need be involved. Many of the complexities in free speech law
have arisen from this distinction, though the implications of the distinction are
of course sharply contested.
New technologies may weaken or even undo the distinction between these
two categories. In the long-term future, the "mail" analogy may become the
more apposite one, as it becomes simpler and cheaper for a person to send
communications to any particular person, or to a large group of people, on
such terms as he chooses. Communications may decreasingly come in an
indivisible package, and increasingly take the particular form that the particular
actors choose. Perhaps in the future, "broadcasting" will increasingly have this
154. Consider the FCC's quite promising auction system. in which points arc granted to minonty and
women applicants. See John McMillan. Selling Spectrum Rights. 1. ECON. PERSP.. Summcr 1994. at 145.
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characteristic. Often the purchaser of the relevant information will pay for it
without the intermediation of advertisers.' 55 In such a future, the
constitutional issues will take on different dimensions. A key question will be
the extent to which the owner or manager of the "mail" may be held liable for
injuries that occur as a result of use of some service. It will be plausible to say
that just as the United States and Federal Express are not liable for harms
caused by packages they carry, so too the owner of an electronic service ought
not to pay damages for harms that owners cannot reasonably be expected to
prevent or control. But it is far too soon to offer particular judgments on the
issues that will arise.
It is nonetheless possible to describe certain categories of regulation and
to set out some general guidelines about how they might be approached. I have
suggested that existing law provides principles and analogies on which it
makes sense to draw. An exploration of new problems confirms this
suggestion. It shows that current categories can be invoked fairly
straightforwardly to make sense of likely future dilemmas.
A large lesson may emerge from the discussion. Often participants in legal
disputes, and especially in constitutional disputes, disagree sharply with respect
to high-level, abstract issues; the debate between Madisonians and marketplace
advocates is an obvious illustration. But sometimes such disputants can
converge, or narrow their disagreement a great deal, by grappling with highly
particular problems. In other words, debate over abstractions may conceal a
potential for productive discussion and even agreement over particulars.'56
Perhaps this is a strategy through which we might make much progress in the
next generation of free speech law.
1. Requiring Competition
Many actual and imaginable legislative efforts are designed to ensure
competition in the new communications markets. There is no constitutional
problem with such efforts.' 57 The only qualification is that some such efforts
might be seen as subterfuge for content regulation, disguised by a claimed
need to promote monopoly; but this should be a relatively rare event. If
government is genuinely attempting to prevent monopolistic practices, and to
offer a structure in which competition can take place, there is no basis for
constitutional complaint. Here First Amendment theorists of widely divergent
views might be brought into agreement.

155. It is now impossible to know exactly what sorts of communications packages will be provided.
156. See Sunstein, supra note 94.
157. See also KRATTENMAKER & PoWF, supra note 25 (favoring legal efforts to encourage
competition).
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2. Subsidizing New Media
It is predictable that government might seek to assist certain technologies
that offer great promise for the future. Some such efforts may in fact be a
result of interest-group pressure. But in general, there is no constitutional
obstacle to government efforts to subsidize preferred communications sources.
Perhaps government believes that some technological innovations are especially
likely to do well, or that they could receive particularly valuable benefits from
national assistance. At least so long as there is no reason to believe that
government is favoring speech of a certain content, efforts of this kind are
unobjectionable as a matter of law.' 58 They may be objectionable as a matter
of policy, since government may make bad judgments reflecting confusion or
factional influence; but that is a different issue.
3.

Subsidizing ParticularProgramming or ParticularBroadcasters

In her dissenting opinion in Turner, Justice O'Connor suggested that the
appropriate response to government desire for programming of a certain
content is not regulation but instead subsidization.'59 This idea fits well with
the basic model for campaign finance regulation, set out in Buckley v.
Valeo.' 6 It also fits with the idea, found in Rust v. Sullivan,'61 that the

government is unconstrained in its power to subsidize such speech as it prefers.
Hence there should be no constitutional objection to government efforts to fund
public broadcasting, to pay for high-quality fare for children, or to support
programming that deals with public affairs. 62 Perhaps government might do
this for certain uses of the Internet.
To be sure, it is doubtful that Rust would be taken to its logical extreme.
Could the government fund the Democratic Convention but not the Republican
Convention? Could the government announce that it would fund only those
public-affairs programs that spoke approvingly of current government policy?
If we take the First Amendment to ban viewpoint discrimination, funding of
this kind should be held to be improperly motivated. On the other hand,
government subsidies of educational and public-affairs programming need not
158. This follows from Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
159. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. C1. 2445. 2478 (1994) (O'Connor. J . dissenting).
160. 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
161. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
162. There is a question of policy in the background, made highly visible by controversy over
government funding of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the National Endowment for the
Humanities. In principle, such funding is justified in light of the "public good" fcatures of the relevant
products and in light of the possibility that the funded sources can increase opportunities for preference
formation by providing greater exposure to high-quality material. See ANDERSON. supra note 135. at 149.
But the ultimate value of funding depends on a range of more practical and empirical issues that cannot
be decided a priori,including the actual products that result, the opportunities to provide private funding
instead, and the alternative use of government money.
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raise serious risks of viewpoint discrimination. It therefore seems
unexceptionable for government, short of viewpoint discrimination, to subsidize
those broadcasters whose programming it prefers, even if any such preference
embodies content discrimination. So too, government might promote
"conversations" or fora on e-mail that involve issues of public importance, or
that attempt to promote educational goals for children or even adults.' 63

4. Leaving Admittedly "Open" ChannelsAvailable to Others Who Would
Not Otherwise Get Carriage
Suppose that a particular communications carrier has room for five
hundred channels; suppose that four hundred channels are filled, but that one
hundred are left open. Would it be legitimate for government to say that the
one hundred must be filled by stations that would otherwise be unable be pay
for carriage? Let us suppose that the stations would be chosen through a
content-neutral system, such as a lottery. From the First Amendment point of
view, this approach seems acceptable. The government would be attempting
to ensure access for speakers who would otherwise be unable to reach the
audience. It is possible that as a matter of policy, government should have to
provide some payment to the carrier in return for the access requirement. But
there does not seem to be a First Amendment problem.
5. Requiring CarriersTo Be Common Carriersfor a Certain Number of
Stations, Filling Vacancies with a Lottery System or 1imesharing
In her dissenting opinion in Turner, Justice O'Connor suggested the
possibility that carriers could be required to set aside certain channels to be
filled by a random method. t64 The advantage of this approach is that it would
promote access for people who would otherwise be denied carriage, but
without involving government in decisions about preferred content. This
approach should raise no First Amendment difficulties.
6. Imposing Structural Regulation DesignedNot To Prevent a
Conventional Market Failure, But To Ensure Universal or NearUniversal Consumer Access to Networks
The protection of broadcasters in Turner was specifically designed to
ensure continued viewer access to free programming. Notably, the Court
permitted government to achieve this goal through regulation rather than
163. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15 (discussing role of new technologies in connection
with elections).
164. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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through subsidy. Of course subsidy is the simpler and ordinarily more efficient
route. If government wants to make sure that all consumers have access to
communications networks, why should government not be required to pay to
allow such access, on a kind of analogue to the food stamp program? The
ordinary response to a problem of access is not to fix prices but instead to
subsidize people who would otherwise be without access. The Turner Court
apparently believed that it is constitutionally acceptable for the government to
ensure that industry (and subscribers), rather than taxpayers, provide the
funding for those who would otherwise lack access.
The precise implications of this holding remain to be seen. It is impossible
to foresee the range of structural regulations that might be proposed in an
effort to ensure that all or almost all citizens have access to free programming
or to some communications network, including any parts of the "informational
superhighway." Some such regulations might in fact be based on other, more
invidious motives, such as favoritism toward a particular set of suppliers; as
we have seen, this may well be true of the measure in Turner itself. The
Turner decision means that courts should review with some care any
governmental claim that regulation is actually based on an effort to promote
free access. But the key point here is that if the claim can be made out on the
facts, structural regulation should be found acceptable.
7. Protecting Against Obscene, Libelous, Violent, Commercial, or
HarassingBroadcasting or Messages
New technologies have greatly expanded the opportunity to communicate
obscene, libelous, violent, or harassing messages-perhaps to general groups
via stations on (for example) cable television, perhaps to particular people via
electronic mail. 165 Invasions of privacy are far more likely. The Internet
poses special problems on these counts. As a general rule, any restrictions
should be treated like those governing ordinary speech, with ordinary mail
providing the best analogy. If restrictions are narrowly tailored, and supported
by a sufficiently strong record, they should be upheld.
Consider in this regard the highly publicized case involving "cyberporn"
at the University of Michigan.166 A student is alleged to have distributed a
fictional story involving a fellow student, explicitly named, who was, in the
story, raped, tortured, and finally killed. The first question raised here is
whether state or federal law provides a cause of action for conduct of this sort.
Perhaps the story amounts to a threat, or a form of libel, or perhaps the most
plausible state law claim would be based on intentional infliction of emotional
165. See Branscomb, supra note 141.
166. See Stephen Levy, TechnoMania, NEwSWEEK, Feb. 27. 1995. at 24. 29; Peter H. Lewts. Wrter
Arrested After Sending Violent Fiction over Internet, N.Y. TIMEs. Feb. I I. 1995, at A 10.

HeinOnline -- 104 Yale L.J. 1799 1994-1995

1800

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 104: 1757

distress. The next question is whether, if a state law claim is available, the
award of damages would violate the First Amendment. At first glance it seems
that the question should be resolved in the same way as any case in which a
writer uses a real person's name in fiction of this sort. And it certainly does
not seem clear that the First Amendment should prohibit states from awarding
damages for conduct of this kind, so long as no political issue is involved. 167
Perhaps the ease of massive distribution of such materials, which can be sent
to much of the world with the touch of a button, argues in favor of loosening
the constitutional constraints on compensatory damages.
What of a regulatory regime designed to prevent invasion of privacy, libel,
unwanted commercial messages, and obscenity,16 8 harassment, or infliction
of emotional distress? Some such regulatory regime will ultimately make a
great deal of sense. The principal obstacles are that the regulations should be
both clear and narrow. It is easy to imagine a broad or vague regulation, one
that would seize upon the sexually explicit or violent nature of communication
to justify regulation that is far broader than necessary. Moreover, it is possible
to imagine a situation in which liability was extended to any owner or operator
who could have no knowledge of the particular materials being sent.'69 The
underlying question, having to do with efficient risk allocation, involves the
extent to which a carrier might be expected to find and to stop unlawful
messages; that question depends upon the relevant technology.
Consider more particularly possible efforts to control the distribution of
sexually explicit materials on the Internet. Insofar as the government seeks to
ban materials that are technically obscene, and imposes civil or criminal
liability on someone with specific intent to distribute such materials, there
should be no constitutional problem. By hypothesis, these materials lack
constitutional protection, and materials lacking constitutional protection can be
banned in cyberspace as everywhere else. On the other hand, many actual and
imaginable bills would extend beyond the technically obscene, to include (for
example) materials that are "indecent," or "lewd," or "filthy."'7 0 Terms of
this sort create a serious risk of unconstitutional vagueness or overbreadth."'
At least at first glance, they appear unconstitutional for that reason.
167. See Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,51-52 (1988).
168. See S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1995), which would have extended liability to
telecommunications providers of obscene materials.
169. In January 1995, for example, Senator Jim Exon (D-Neb.) introduced S. 314, the Communications
Decency Act of 1995, in the U.S. Senate. In an effort to control digital pornography, it originally would
have made all telecommunications providers doing business in the United States (from the telephone
companies, all the way down to offices that use local area networks) liable for the content of anything sent
over their networks. As it emerged from committee, S.314 exempted carriers from liability. Id.; see also
Peter H. Lewis, Despite a New Plan for Cooling It Off, Cybersex Stays Hot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995,
at 1, 34 (discussing S.314 and its potential unconstitutionality)
Sess. (1995).
170. See, e.g., S.314, 104th Cong., Ist
171. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-31 (1989); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Action for Children's Television v. FCC. 932
F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1281 (1992).
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The best justification for expansive terms of this kind would be to protect
children from harmful materials. It is true that the Internet contains
pornography accessible to children, some of it coming from adults explicitly
seeking sexual relations with children. There is in fact material on the Internet
containing requests to children for their home addresses.' n Solicitations to
engage in unlawful activity are unprotected by the First Amendment, whether
they occur on the Internet or anywhere else. For this reason, regulation
designed to prevent these sorts of requests should not be held unconstitutional.
But when government goes beyond solicitation, and bans "indecent" or
"filthy" material in general, the question is quite different. Here a central issue
is whether the government has chosen the least restrictive means of preventing
the relevant harms to children. In a case involving "dial-a-porn," for example,
the Court struck down a ban on "indecent" materials on the ground that
children could be protected in other ways. 73 On the Madisonian view, this
outcome is questionable, since "dial-a-porn" ranks low on the First
Amendment hierarchy. But under existing law, it seems clear that in order to
support an extension beyond obscenity, Congress would have to show that less
restrictive alternatives would be ineffectual. The question then becomes a
factual one: What sorts of technological options exist by which parents or
others can provide the relevant protection? To answer this question, it would
be necessary to explore the possibility of creating "locks" within the Internet,
for use by parents, or perhaps for use by those who write certain sorts of
74
materials. 1
Different questions would be raised by the imposition of civil or criminal
liability not on the distributors having specific intent to distribute, but on
carriers who have no knowledge of the specific materials at issue, and could
not obtain such knowledge without considerable difficulty and expense. It
might be thought that the carrier should be treated like a publisher, and a
publisher can of course be held liable for obscene or libelous materials even
if the publisher has no specific knowledge of the offending material. But in
light of the relatively low costs of search in the world of magazine and book
publishing, it is reasonable to think that a publisher should be charged with
having control over the content of its publications. Perhaps the same cannot be
said for the owner of an electronic mail service. Here the proper analogy might
instead be the carriage of mail, in which owners of services are not held
criminally or civilly liable for obscene or libelous materials. The underlying
theory is that it would be unreasonable to expect such owners to inspect all the
materials they transport, and the imposition of criminal liability, at least, would
have an unacceptably harmful effect upon a desirable service involving the
172. James Coates. Access to Answers, CHI. TRIB.. Mar. 27. 1995, § 4. at I. 4.
173. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 128-31.

174. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic
Heartof the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media. 104 YALE LU. 1619. 1632-34 (1995).

HeinOnline -- 104 Yale L.J. 1801 1994-1995

1802

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 104: 1757

distribution of a great deal of protected speech. If carriers were held liable for
distributing unprotected speech, there would inevitably be an adverse effect on
the dissemination of protected speech too. In other words, the problem with
carrier liability, in this context, is that it would interfere with protected as well
as unprotected speech.
How do these points bear on the First Amendment issue with respect to
the Internet? Some of the services that provide access to the Internet should
not themselves be treated as speakers; they are providers of speech, but their
own speech is not at issue. This point is closely related to the debate in Turner
about the speech status of cable carriers. But whether or not a carrier or
provider is a speaker, a harmful effect on speech would raise First Amendment
issues. We can see this point with an analogy. Certainly it would not be
constitutional to say that truck owners will be criminally liable for carrying
newspapers containing articles critical of the President. Such a measure would
be unconstitutional in its purposes and in its effects, even if the truck owners
are not speakers. From this we can see that a criminal penalty on carriers of
material that is independently protected by the First Amendment should be
unconstitutional. Thus a criminal penalty could not be imposed for providing
"filthy" speech, at least if "filthy" speech is otherwise protected.
But a penalty imposed on otherwise unprotected materials raises a different
question. Suppose that the government imposes criminal liability on carriers
or providers of admittedly obscene material on the Internet. The adverse effect
on unprotected speech should not by itself be found to offend the Constitution,
even if there would be a harmful economic effect, and even unfairness, for the
provider of the service. Instead the constitutional question should turn on the
extent of the adverse effects on the dissemination of materials that are
protected by the Constitution. If, for example, the imposition of criminal
liability for the distribution of unprotected speech had serious harmful effects
for the distribution of protected speech, the First Amendment issue would be
quite severe. But that question cannot be answered in the abstract; it depends
on what the relevant record shows with respect to any such adverse effects.
To answer that question, we need to know whether carrier liability, for
unprotected speech, has a significant adverse effect on protected speech as
well. We need to know, in short, whether the proper analogy is to a publisher
or instead to a carrier of mail. It is therefore important to know whether a
carrier could, at relatively low expense, filter out constitutionally unprotected
material, or whether, on the contrary, the imposition of criminal liability for
unprotected material would drive legitimate carriers out of business, or force
them to try to undertake impossible or unrealistically expensive "searches."
The answer to this question will depend in large part on the state of
technology.
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Imposing Content-Based Regulation Designed To Ensure PublicAffairs and EducationalProgramming

It can readily be imagined that Congress might seek to promote education
via regulation or subsidy of new media. It might try to ensure attention to
public affairs. Suppose, for example, that Congress sets aside a number of
channels for public-affairs and educational programming, on the theory that the
marketplace provides too much commercial programming. This notion has in
fact been under active consideration in Congress. Thus a recent bill would
have required all telecommunications carriers to provide access at preferential
rates to educational and health care institutions, state and local governments,
public broadcast stations, libraries and other public entities, community
newspapers, and broadcasters in the smallest markets.""
Turner certainly does not stand for the proposition that such efforts are
constitutional. By hypothesis, any such regulation would be content-based. It
would therefore meet with a high level of judicial skepticism. On the other
hand, Turner does not authoritatively suggest that such efforts are
unconstitutional. The Court did not itself say whether it would accept content
discrimination designed to promote Madisonian goals. Certainly the opinion
suggests that the government's burden would be a significant one. But it does
not resolve the question.
It is notable that Justice O'Connor's opinion appears quite sensible on this
point, and she leaves the issue open.'76 As I have noted, her principal
argument is that the "must-carry" rules are too crude. Certainly crudely tailored
measures give reason to believe that interest-group pressures, rather than a
legitimate effort to improve educational and public-affairs programming, are
at work. But if the relevant measures actually promote Madisonian goals, they
should be upheld. There is of course reason to fear that any such measures
have less legitimate purposes and functions, and hence a degree of judicial
skepticism is appropriate. But narrow measures, actually promoting those
purposes, are constitutionally legitimate.
VI. MADISON IN CYBERSPACE?

Do Madisonian ideals have an enduring role in American thought about
freedom of speech? The Supreme Court has not said for certain; its signals are
quite mixed; and the existence of new technologies makes the question
different and far more complex than it once was. It is conceivable that in a
world of newly emerging and countless options, the market will prove literally

175. S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 103(a) (1994) (Communications Act of 1994).
176. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC. 114 S. Ct. 2445. 2478 (O'Connor, .. dissntng)-
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unstoppable, as novel possibilities outstrip even well-motivated government
controls.
If so, this result should not be entirely lamented. It would be an
understatement to say that a world in which consumers can choose from
limitless choices has many advantages, not least from the Madisonian point of
view. If choices are limitless, people interested in politics can see and listen
to politics; perhaps they can even participate in politics, and in ways that were
impossible just a decade ago. But that world would be far from perfect. It may
increase social balkanization. It may not promote deliberation, but foster
instead a series of referenda in cyberspace that betray constitutional goals.
My central point here has been that the system of free expression is not
an aimless abstraction. Far from being an outgrowth of neoclassical economics,
the First Amendment has independent and identifiable purposes. Free speech
doctrine, with its proliferating tests, distinctions, and subparts, should not lose
touch with those purposes. Rooted in a remarkable conception of political
sovereignty, the goals of the First Amendment are closely connected with the
founding commitment to a particular kind of polity: a deliberative democracy
among informed citizens who are political equals. It follows that instead of
allowing new technologies to use democratic processes for their own purposes,
constitutional law should be concerned with harnessing those technologies for
democratic ends-including the founding aspirations to public deliberation,
citizenship, political equality, and even a certain kind of virtue. If the new
technologies offer risks on these scores, they hold out enormous promise as
well. I have argued here that whether that promise will be realized depends in
significant part on judgments of law, including judgments about the point of
the First Amendment.
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